We are fighters for peace
Postcard showing five of the diplomats and statesmen responsible for the Treaty of Portsmouth. A portrait of President Roosevelt is featured in the middle.
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Creation Date
1905
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Postcard showing five of the diplomats and statesmen responsible for the Treaty of Portsmouth. A portrait of President Roosevelt is featured in the middle.
1905
William N. Tilchin argues that three principles that guided the foreign policy of Theodore Roosevelt–the global interests principle, the power principle, and the civilization principle–were also at the heart of the bipartisan foreign policy of the United States that prevailed in the Cold War. Tilchin gives examples of how each of these principles manifested themselves during Roosevelt’s presidency, citing Roosevelt’s mediation of the Russo-Japanese War, the growth of the U.S. Navy, and a warm relationship with Great Britain. Tilchin says that these principles were largely ignored by Roosevelt’s successors, but that they were rediscovered during World War II and sustained during the Cold War.
A photograph of Tilchin appears in the article, and the article is followed by a full-page photograph of Roosevelt standing next to, and with his right hand resting on a large globe.
William N. Tilchin provides an overview of President Theodore Roosevelt’s foreign policy in which he identifies the three precepts which guided his diplomacy–engagement with the world, building and maintaining American naval power, and fostering the Anglo-American “special relationship”–along with the three phases of Roosevelt’s foreign policy. Tilchin examines episodes such as the Venezuelan and Moroccan crises to demonstrate how Roosevelt’s diplomacy led to the the peaceful conclusion of these episodes. Tilchin notes that Roosevelt’s precepts fell out of favor until the events of World War II led to their revival and their use by subsequent administrations, and he highlights figures such as Henry Kissinger and George P. Schultz who practiced “Rooseveltian” statesmanship.
A photograph of Tilchin, photographs of three United States Secretaries of State, an image of Roosevelt, and a political cartoon populate the essay.
William N. Tilchin examines why Theodore Roosevelt won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1906 for his mediation of the Russo-Japanese War. Tilchin asserts that Roosevelt had gained a great deal of diplomatic experience prior to the 1905 negotiations at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, including his work in acquiring the rights to build the Panama Canal. Tilchin also notes that Roosevelt had a sense of the larger geopolitical stakes at hand in the war; namely, preserving the balance of power in both Asia and Europe, and he highlights how Roosevelt deployed his friendships with Kentaro Kaneko of Japan and the United States Ambassador to Russia George von Lengerke Meyer throughout the negotiations.
Three photographs appear in the essay, including one of Roosevelt with the peace commissioners from Russia and Japan and one of Tilchin at the site of the treaty negotiations at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.
William N. Tilchin organizes, explains, and defends the diplomacy of President Theodore Roosevelt. Tilchin lays out the three guiding principles of Roosevelt’s foreign policy: that the United States needs to engage with the global community; that power must be behind the nation’s diplomacy; and the United States should cultivate a close relationship with Great Britain. Tilchin also examines Roosevelt’s style of diplomacy with an emphasis on his personal direction and informality, and he describes the precepts of “big stick diplomacy.” Tilchin also divides Roosevelt’s foreign policy into three periods during his presidency, and he cites specific examples of Roosevelt’s management of various crises and events from the acquisition of the Panama Canal to the voyage of the Great White Fleet. Tilchin highlights Roosevelt’s careful and continual cultivation of a relationship with Great Britain, and he examines Roosevelt’s legacy by looking at the foreign policy undertaken by succeeding administrations in the twentieth century.
Photographs of Roosevelt as assistant secretary of the navy, army officer, and president appear in the text as does a photograph of Secretary of State George P. Schultz.
William N. Tilchin examines the foreign policy of President Theodore Roosevelt. Tilchin asserts that Roosevelt was not interested in practicing coercive, economic diplomacy, and he identifies the nations that Roosevelt saw as friendly, such as Great Britain, and those he treated cautiously, Germany and Japan. Tilchin looks at how Roosevelt undertook his diplomacy, identifying five elements of “big stick diplomacy,” such as strengthening the United States Navy. Tilchin identifies discrete episodes or crises in Roosevelt’s presidency, and he describes how Roosevelt resolved them, including the mediation of the Russo-Japanese War, Germany’s attempt to bully Venezuela, and the revolt in Panama. He highlights Roosevelt’s dispatch of the Great White Fleet, his reluctance to invoke the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, and his diplomacy during Morocco’s dispute with Germany.
A photograph of Roosevelt with Emperor William II of Germany, and pictures of the Great White Fleet and Secretary of State Elihu Root supplement the text, as does a political cartoon of Roosevelt.
President Roosevelt informs Senator Lodge that he has been asked by the governments of Japan and Russia to initiate a peace process between the two warring nations. Roosevelt says he has a low opinion of the Russians, and he says that the United States will have nothing to fear from Japan as long the United States Navy is kept at the ready.
Theodore Roosevelt Association Journal
1905-06-05
William N. Tilchin examines why Theodore Roosevelt won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1906 for his mediation of the Russo-Japanese War. Tilchin asserts that Roosevelt had gained a great deal of diplomatic experience prior to the 1905 negotiations at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, including his work in acquiring the rights to build the Panama Canal. Tilchin also notes that Roosevelt had a sense of the larger geopolitical stakes at hand in the war; namely, preserving the balance of power in both Asia and Europe, and he highlights how Roosevelt deployed his friendships with Kentaro Kaneko of Japan and the United States Ambassador to Russia George von Lengerke Meyer throughout the negotiations.
A silhouette illustration and three photographs of Roosevelt accompany the article as does a text box acknowledging the financial firm Roosevelt & Cross for its support of the Theodore Roosevelt Association.
Theodore Roosevelt was the first American and the first President to win the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of his success in helping mediate an end to the Russo-Japanese War. Roosevelt donated the prize money he received to charity.
Theodore Roosevelt Association Journal
1986
John A. Gable examines the similarities between the reelection campaigns of President Theodore Roosevelt in 1904 and President Ronald Reagan in 1984. Gable discusses the foreign policy issues faced by Roosevelt, and he notes the marked policy differences between Roosevelt and Reagan. He closes with a look at how presidents have fared in trying to win a second term. A photograph of Reagan in front of the Roosevelt statue at Theodore Roosevelt Island in Washington, D.C., comprises the second page of the article.
Theodore Roosevelt Association Journal
1984-08-20
Secretary of Defense Weinberger quotes extensively from Theodore Roosevelt in his address to the crowd assembled for the launching of the USS Theodore Roosevelt. He notes Roosevelt’s winning of the Nobel Peace Prize, emphasizing that Roosevelt’s record demonstrates a commitment to peace bolstered by a strong navy. Weinberger also reviews the defense policy of the administration of President Ronald Reagan, and relates how the Theodore Roosevelt will strengthen the nation’s navy and its ability to guard the world’s sea lanes.
A photograph of Weinberger speaking at the ship’s launching supplements the text of the speech.
Remarks by William Davison Johnston, President of the Theodore Roosevelt Association, upon the presentation of the Nobel Peace Prize Medal awarded to President Theodore Roosevelt in 1906, to President Reagan at the White House in October 1982.
A photograph showing both sides of the medal awarded to Roosevelt and a photograph of Johnston and Reagan at the White House ceremony accompany the article.
A concise overview of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 which covers the major land and sea battles and examines Theodore Roosevelt’s role in mediating a settlement of the conflict.
Theodore Roosevelt Association Journal
1983
John A. Gable details President Theodore Roosevelt’s winning of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1906. Gable looks at Roosevelt’s mediation of the Russo-Japanese War, his refusal to accept the prize money, and his acceptance speech in 1910. Gable discusses the distribution of the prize money to various charities during World War I, and he closes with an overview of Roosevelt’s foreign policy achievements.
A photograph of the case that enclosed the Nobel Peace Prize diploma accompanies the article.
In the context of President Jimmy Carter’s work negotiating a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, William C. Sexton reviews President Theodore Roosevelt’s mediation of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 and argues that Roosevelt’s actions set the table for future presidents to act as peacemakers. He looks at Roosevelt’s actions during the negotiations, reviews some of his administration’s other accomplishments, and says that advances in technology like those pioneered by the Wright brothers added to America’s power and prestige.
A listing of the Officers of the Theodore Roosevelt Association is found on the second page of this article.
President Roosevelt writes to journalist and explorer George Kennan regarding his article in The Outlook titled “The Sword of Peace in Japan.” He explains that Kennan’s analysis of Japan’s role in the peace agreement is incorrect, and supports his position with confidential facts. Kennan is told that none of the information in the letter is to be made public, but that he may use it to draw more accurate conclusions. Roosevelt explains that he himself did not force Japan into peace, and that he was not interested in boosting his own reputation through the negotiations. Japan willfully asked for the peace agreement, and also for Roosevelt’s involvement. Despite Kennan’s claims, Japan was in no position to demand an indemnity. The cost of the war, both literal and figurative, was too great for Japan to bear, and so they chose to negotiate for peace. They do not want these facts revealed for fear of embarrassment, Roosevelt explains. He supports Japan’s decisions, although he believes they could have fought harder in the agreement for the ownership of the northern half of Sakhalin Island. He quotes a note from Japan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs to support his claims.
Library of Congress Manuscript Division
1905-10-15
Reports indicate General Pavel I. Mischenko of Russia and his Cossack troops have deliberately invaded neutral territory in China. Because China seems unwilling to enforce its neutrality, it is believed that Japan must protect itself against the Russian raids that violate neutral territory.
Library of Congress Manuscript Division
1905-01
President Roosevelt stands on “neutral ground” in the center of a variety of fights. Some of the fights include New York Senator Thomas Collier Platt and New York Governor Benjamin B. Odell; “Stand Pat” and “Reciprocity”; “Russia” and “Japan”; and “Uncle Sam” and “the trusts.”
Library of Congress Manuscript Division
1904-03-27
Emily Tyler Carow thanks President Roosevelt for the Saint-Gaudens medallion. Carow likes it because she believes the medallion is “strong yet artistic.” She also remarks on the peace prospects between Russia and Japan. Several foreign diplomats, including the Japanese minister, have complimented Roosevelt. Carow believes they are grateful for Roosevelt’s “moral support.”
Library of Congress Manuscript Division
1905-07-23
Captain Pershing encloses data on the number of Japanese casualties during the Russo-Japanese War.
Library of Congress Manuscript Division
1905-12-11