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There has been a considerable amount of activity in the past week near the railroad in Manchuria, and the Russians seem to be falling back rapidly. The key to the Russian position is Kirin, and the Japanese appear to be moving on it from the east, southeast, and south. Japan can now move her forces and supplies by sea with complete safety.
Library of Congress Manuscript Division
1905-06-23
President Roosevelt watches as Russian Emperor Nicholas II and Japanese Emperor Meiji shake hands. Nicholas II says, “Oh joyski,” while Meiji says, “Banzai.” In the background, “France,” John Bull, Russian General N. P. Linevich, and Japanese Field Marshal Iwao Ōyama cheer. Linevich says, “Have a vodka with me, my dear Ōyama,” while Ōyama says, “No, this is on me, general.” Roosevelt says, “Bless you, my peaceful children, de-lighted,” as a large Roosevelt face eclipses the “war” sun.
Library of Congress Manuscript Division
1905-08-30
Field Marshal Oyama Iwao, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces, stands at the top of a hill, holding binoculars, while troops move artillery up the hill behind him. A battle rages in the background.
Field Marshal Oyama Iwao was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War. His troops’ overrunning of cities (like Port Arthur) and lands were viewed as massacres, but he swept vast lands and rapidly routed Russian and native forces. Puck characterized the decisive warmaking gifts of General Oyama Iwao as providing the most decisive form of peacemaking.
President Roosevelt writes to journalist and explorer George Kennan regarding his article in The Outlook titled “The Sword of Peace in Japan.” He explains that Kennan’s analysis of Japan’s role in the peace agreement is incorrect, and supports his position with confidential facts. Kennan is told that none of the information in the letter is to be made public, but that he may use it to draw more accurate conclusions. Roosevelt explains that he himself did not force Japan into peace, and that he was not interested in boosting his own reputation through the negotiations. Japan willfully asked for the peace agreement, and also for Roosevelt’s involvement. Despite Kennan’s claims, Japan was in no position to demand an indemnity. The cost of the war, both literal and figurative, was too great for Japan to bear, and so they chose to negotiate for peace. They do not want these facts revealed for fear of embarrassment, Roosevelt explains. He supports Japan’s decisions, although he believes they could have fought harder in the agreement for the ownership of the northern half of Sakhalin Island. He quotes a note from Japan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs to support his claims.
Library of Congress Manuscript Division
1905-10-15
President Roosevelt tells his son Kermit Roosevelt about some goings-on at the White House, including a sprained ankle and a visit from George Kennan. Roosevelt is pleased by Kermit’s decision to stay in Groton.
Library of Congress Manuscript Division
1906-06-09
In response to an article in which George Kennan got facts about the peace between Russia and Japan wrong, President Roosevelt sends him information about the decision-making that led to the final peace deal. Roosevelt sends this for Kennan private information, because he believes that Kennan as a journalist is taken too seriously to misunderstand and misrepresent the facts.
Library of Congress Manuscript Division
1905-10-15
President Roosevelt shares his views on “easy divorce” among New York’s upper classes with Robert Grant, who recently wrote a magazine article on the topic. Roosevelt praises Japan’s military spending and bemoans the state of foreign affairs in the United States.
Library of Congress Manuscript Division
1905-03-14
President Roosevelt and Secretary of State John Hay have found George Kennan’s letter interesting, and Roosevelt looks forward to speaking with Kennan in person regarding Kennan’s conclusions about the Russo-Japanese War.
Library of Congress Manuscript Division
1905-01-06
President Roosevelt tells William Sturgis Bigelow the book is the “most interesting present I have received.” Roosevelt especially enjoyed the night photographs of the lions. The president also remarks, “Banzai! How the fur will fly when Nogi joins Ōyama!”
Library of Congress Manuscript Division
1905-01-07
General Hamilton commends President Roosevelt for his tact with handling San Francisco’s challenges to the Gentlemen’s agreement with Japan. He discusses different forms of combat. He believes that Japanese and Russian soldiers are more prone to fight in hand-to-hand combat, while superior soldiers rely on firearms. Hamilton relays his opinion of Captain Tanaka and Tamemoto Kuroki, and Japanese men more broadly. Hamilton was happy to see the photographs of Roosevelt riding his horse.
Library of Congress Manuscript Division
1907-06-11
The Office of Naval Intelligence reports on the positions and movements of the Russian and Japanese armies during the Battle of Mudken, which took place along the Hun River near the Manchurian city of Mukden, now Shenyang in the province of Liaoning. The report also details the movements of Russia’s Third Pacific Fleet.
Library of Congress Manuscript Division
1905-03-10
William Sturgis Bigelow has just sent President Roosevelt a book of animal photography on the “chance of your stocking being still up.” In a postscript, Bigelow mentions press coverage of the Russo-Japanese war, and that Europe has been asking Roosevelt to mediate between the powers, and comments that he feels like the Japanese will end the war themselves soon enough through victory.
Library of Congress Manuscript Division
1905-01-03
President Roosevelt writes to journalist and explorer George Kennan regarding his article in The Outlook titled “The Sword of Peace in Japan.” He explains that Kennan’s analysis of Japan’s role in the peace agreement is incorrect, and supports his position with confidential facts. Kennan is told that none of the information in the letter is to be made public, but that he may use it to draw more accurate conclusions. Roosevelt explains that he himself did not force Japan into peace, and that he was not interested in boosting his own reputation through the negotiations. Japan willfully asked for the peace agreement, and also for Roosevelt’s involvement. Despite Kennan’s claims, Japan was in no position to demand an indemnity. The cost of the war, both literal and figurative, was too great for Japan to bear, and so they chose to negotiate for peace. They do not want these facts revealed for fear of embarrassment, Roosevelt explains. He supports Japan’s decisions, although he believes they could have fought harder in the agreement for the ownership of the northern half of Sakhalin Island. He quotes a note from Japan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs to support his claims.
Library of Congress Manuscript Division
1905-10-15
The Office of Naval Intelligence provides a brief update on the status and movements of the Japanese and Russian naval forces.
Library of Congress Manuscript Division
1905-01-13