Russia (Federation)--Sakhalin (Sakhalinskai︠a︡ oblastʹ)

William N. Tilchin examines why Theodore Roosevelt won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1906 for his mediation of the Russo-Japanese War. Tilchin asserts that Roosevelt had gained a great deal of diplomatic experience prior to the 1905 negotiations at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, including his work in acquiring the rights to build the Panama Canal. Tilchin also notes that Roosevelt had a sense of the larger geopolitical stakes at hand in the war; namely, preserving the balance of power in both Asia and Europe, and he highlights how Roosevelt deployed his friendships with Kentaro Kaneko of Japan and the United States Ambassador to Russia George von Lengerke Meyer throughout the negotiations.

Three photographs appear in the essay, including one of Roosevelt with the peace commissioners from Russia and Japan and one of Tilchin at the site of the treaty negotiations at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.

Collection

Theodore Roosevelt Association Journal

Henry J. Hendrix describes the negotiations in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, between Russia and Japan in an effort to end the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. Hendrix also details the role played by President Theodore Roosevelt, especially his use of third parties to act as intermediaries between him and the warring powers. Hendrix notes that Roosevelt persuaded the Japanese to surrender their demand for an indemnity from the Russians, convincing them that asking for a payment would appear to the world as continuing the war simply for money. Hendrix asserts that studying the negotiations reveals that Roosevelt was in charge of his diplomacy; that he was “deeply involved” in the process; and that he made effective use of back-channel or third party diplomacy. 

Two photographs and two political cartoons of Roosevelt illustrate the article.

William N. Tilchin examines why Theodore Roosevelt won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1906 for his mediation of the Russo-Japanese War. Tilchin asserts that Roosevelt had gained a great deal of diplomatic experience prior to the 1905 negotiations at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, including his work in acquiring the rights to build the Panama Canal. Tilchin also notes that Roosevelt had a sense of the larger geopolitical stakes at hand in the war; namely, preserving the balance of power in both Asia and Europe, and he highlights how Roosevelt deployed his friendships with Kentaro Kaneko of Japan and the United States Ambassador to Russia George von Lengerke Meyer throughout the negotiations. 

A silhouette illustration and three photographs of Roosevelt accompany the article as does a text box acknowledging the financial firm Roosevelt & Cross for its support of the Theodore Roosevelt Association.

In an excerpt from his book The Roosevelt Family of Sagamore Hill, Hermann Hagedorn examines Theodore Roosevelt’s exercise of personal diplomacy with the representatives of Russia and Japan in his effort to mediate an end to the Russo-Japanese War. Hagedorn details the delicate diplomacy undertaken by Roosevelt at Sagamore Hill and onboard the presidential yacht Mayflower in August 1905 which helped to secure a final peace treaty in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Hagedorn also describes Roosevelt’s descent in the U.S. Navy’s submarine, the Plunger.

A photograph, a political cartoon, and an illustration depict Roosevelt’s interaction with the envoys from Russia and Japan.

Collection

Theodore Roosevelt Association Journal

President Roosevelt writes to journalist and explorer George Kennan regarding his article in The Outlook titled “The Sword of Peace in Japan.” He explains that Kennan’s analysis of Japan’s role in the peace agreement is incorrect, and supports his position with confidential facts. Kennan is told that none of the information in the letter is to be made public, but that he may use it to draw more accurate conclusions. Roosevelt explains that he himself did not force Japan into peace, and that he was not interested in boosting his own reputation through the negotiations. Japan willfully asked for the peace agreement, and also for Roosevelt’s involvement. Despite Kennan’s claims, Japan was in no position to demand an indemnity. The cost of the war, both literal and figurative, was too great for Japan to bear, and so they chose to negotiate for peace. They do not want these facts revealed for fear of embarrassment, Roosevelt explains. He supports Japan’s decisions, although he believes they could have fought harder in the agreement for the ownership of the northern half of Sakhalin Island. He quotes a note from Japan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs to support his claims.

Collection

Library of Congress Manuscript Division

Creation Date

1905-10-15

President Roosevelt copies two letters he sent to Kentaro Kaneko that he believes finally convinced Japan to give up on an indemnity and reach terms to end the Russo-Japanese War.

Collection

Massachusetts Historical Society

Creation Date

1905-09-01

Secretary of State John Hay’s death was a severe personal loss to President Roosevelt, and he is fortunate to have Elihu Root to take over the State Department. Roosevelt is pleased that Russia is sending Sergei Vitte to negotiate with the Japanese representatives over ending the Russo-Japanese War. However, he is concerned that Vitte and Emperor Nicholas II have not come to terms with the fact that Japan has the upper hand in East Asia. Peace will have to be made with the Japanese as victors. If the Russians cannot reach terms, a “severe defeat” will become an “irredeemable disaster.”

Collection

Massachusetts Historical Society

Creation Date

1905-07-18

The Daily Telegraph clarifies its position reporting international negotiations. Peace talks continue between Russia and Japan in Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

Collection

Library of Congress Manuscript Division

Creation Date

1905-08-15

Herbert H. D. Peirce forwards a message from Baron Komura to President Roosevelt. Komura states that Japan has removed all demands for reimbursement, Russia and Japan have agreed on a division of Sakhalin, and diplomats are now discussing details of the arrangement.

Collection

Library of Congress Manuscript Division

Creation Date

1905-08-29

Press reports indicate that President Roosevelt has been given authority to cede all of Japan’s demands on Russia.

Collection

Library of Congress Manuscript Division

Creation Date

1905-08-28

Transcription of Baron Komura’s telegram. According to Prime Minister Sergie Witte, Emperor Nicholas II still refuses any further concessions. Komura fears that President Roosevelt’s efforts for peace will be futile.

Collection

Library of Congress Manuscript Division

Creation Date

1905-08-28

Confirmation of a telegram from Baron Komura discussing the peace talks with Russia, when Sergei Witte could not accept Japan’s compromise offer.

Collection

Library of Congress Manuscript Division

Creation Date

1905-08-27

George von Lengerke Meyer met with Czar Nicholas II, who refuses to pay indemnities to Japan.

Collection

Library of Congress Manuscript Division

Creation Date

1905-08-24

Ambassador Meyer met with Nicholas II, Emperor of Russia, who refuses to pay war indemnities to Japan. The Emperor would prefer to lose part of Sakhalin rather than pay any money to Japan. William II, German Emperor, is encouraging the Emperor to make peace.

Collection

Library of Congress Manuscript Division

Creation Date

1905-08-24

Walter Wellman offers suggestions for a Russo-Japanese peace agreement. Japan should pay Russia for Sakhalin, and Russia should pay Japan a lesser amount to establish railroads in Manchuria and Korea, as well as contributing to the international commission fund for the Chinese International Railway connecting to the transcontinental lines. A note indicates that Wellman sent his proposal to the plenipotentiaries for both countries.

Collection

Library of Congress Manuscript Division

Creation Date

1905-08-21

President Roosevelt writes to journalist and explorer George Kennan regarding his article in The Outlook titled “The Sword of Peace in Japan.” He explains that Kennan’s analysis of Japan’s role in the peace agreement is incorrect, and supports his position with confidential facts. Kennan is told that none of the information in the letter is to be made public, but that he may use it to draw more accurate conclusions. Roosevelt explains that he himself did not force Japan into peace, and that he was not interested in boosting his own reputation through the negotiations. Japan willfully asked for the peace agreement, and also for Roosevelt’s involvement. Despite Kennan’s claims, Japan was in no position to demand an indemnity. The cost of the war, both literal and figurative, was too great for Japan to bear, and so they chose to negotiate for peace. They do not want these facts revealed for fear of embarrassment, Roosevelt explains. He supports Japan’s decisions, although he believes they could have fought harder in the agreement for the ownership of the northern half of Sakhalin Island. He quotes a note from Japan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs to support his claims.

Collection

Library of Congress Manuscript Division

Creation Date

1905-10-15

President Roosevelt sends Ambassador Reid copies of the dispatches he sent to the Japanese government and the Russian Czar. He discusses the implications of a potential Anglo-Japanese alliance.

Collection

Library of Congress Manuscript Division

Creation Date

1905-09-08

President Roosevelt cannot attend the dinner, but thanks George Brinton McClellan Harvey for the invitation. Roosevelt believes that it is injurious for the Japanese to behave as if they got the worst of the peace negotiations.

Collection

Library of Congress Manuscript Division

Creation Date

1905-09-06

President Roosevelt was pleased to receive James Stillman’s kind letter, but is worried that the positive opinion of his European friends will be short lived. He is disheartened by the progress of peace negotiations between Japan and Russia, as Russia has taken “an impossible position” regarding Sakhalin and its refusal to pay any money, and is refusing to budge an inch. Roosevelt believes that Japan is asking for too much money as a war indemnity, but thinks that this could be solved, and feels that the problem is Russia.

Collection

Library of Congress Manuscript Division

Creation Date

1905-08-28

President Roosevelt gives Herbert H. D. Peirce a message to communicate to Sergei Witte, Roosevelt believes Witte misunderstood his previous message, and attempts to make clear his proposal for Russia paying an indemnity to regain control of the northern part of Sakhalin Island and repatriate military prisoners. The exact price can be decided through further negotiations with Japan–the current issue is simply to agree in principle to such an exchange. Roosevelt believes Russian Emperor Nicholas II should be shown the telegram directly to avoid miscommunication.

Collection

Library of Congress Manuscript Division

Creation Date

1905-08-23